300 Fisher Hall
Princeton, NJ 08544
Welcome! I’m currently a Ph.D. candidate in Politics at Princeton University and a graduate student fellow in The Program for Quantitative and Analytical Political Science (Q-APS). I study the relationship between international economics and militarized conflict, in particular how military coercion affects trade policy. Before coming to Princeton I worked at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington D.C. and studied Political Science and Peace, War, & Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
- Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Bias, Trade Policy, and War
Last updated 14 January 2019
Abstract: Economically advanced, democratic countries trade intensely and scrupulously avoid war with one another. Here, I develop a theory of trade, war, and political bias, in which both trade and war are endogenous objects. Governments can seek to alter poor market access conditions abroad through war and subsequent regime change, in which the victorious country installs a “puppet” government with more liberal policy preferences. Trade policy bargaining is therefore conducted “in the shadow of power” (Powell 1999), with counterfactual wars shaping the policy choices that prevail in times of peace. Equilibrium trade policies balance domestic interests against military threats from abroad. Because they internalize the interests of consumers, democracies naturally afford one another with better market access conditions than autocracies. As a result, democracies experience smaller conflicts of interest with one another, fight less, and trade more.
- Estimating Policy Barriers to Trade
Last updated 10 December 2018
Abstract: To what extent is international trade free and fair? Because policy barriers to trade are often opaque and take on many forms, it is difficult to answer this question while relying on data on observable trade barriers. Here, I propose and implement a structural approach to estimating the magnitude of policy barriers to trade, measured at the trade partner level. The method allows for the possibility that these barriers are both asymmetric and discriminatory, affecting certain trade partners disproportionately. The approach reveals substantial latent policy barriers to trade, many times larger than observed tariffs. It also implies substantial effective policy discrimination, with exporters in subset of favored countries enjoying far superior market access counditions than their peers in unfavored countries. Combined, these results suggest that the existing world trading system remains far from a free and fair ideal.
Works in Progress
- Prohibition, Theft, and Violence: Monopolistic Pricing and Exchange in Illicit Markets
with Colin Krainin and Kristopher Ramsay
- Introduction to Mathematics for Political Science, Summer 2018
Co-taught with Dan Gibbs
- POL 240 / WWS 312: International Relations, Spring 2018 (Preceptor)
Professor: Andrew Moravcsik
- POL 387: International Intervention and the Use of Force, Fall 2017 (Preceptor)
Professor: Melissa Lee
- ENG 102: Introduction to Literary Analysis, Spring 2016
Princeton Prison Teaching Initiative (PTI), Garden State Youth Correctional Facility
- International Relations Theory and the Rise of China, Spring 2014
University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill, Carolina Students Taking Academic Responsibility Through Teaching (C-START) Program
R code to calculate distances between historical capital cities, 1816-present
R code to read, clean, and count international dyadic event data